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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
OUTSOURCING: BENEFITS, RISKS, AND
PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS
Lawrence Loh
Faculty of Business Administration





In this paper, we develop aconccptual model of information technologyoutsourcing using a set of benefits and risks
as determinants and performance as consequences. We then test our model.using primary data from a questionnaire
survey involving the chief information officers in 159 Fortune 500 corporations, combined with appropriate
secondarydata from corporate financial statements. Our results show that technical and business benefits as well
as control and opportunismrisks are critical explanatory factors for outsourcing. In addition, we demonstrate that
outsourcing leads to superior performance but this is moderated by cost structure of the firm.
1. INTRODUCTION Traditionally, firms manage their IT infrastructure through their
in-house IS organizations under what is termed "insourcing."
The outsourcing of information technology (IT) has recently
External vendors are involved in limited ways such as supply of
emerged as an important phenomenon that is accompanied by
hardware and software or operational management on a small-
scale contractual basis. Lately, the "outsourcing" of IT has beenprofound implications for the shape of the new information receiving widespread attention within the IT profession. Related
systems (IS) organization. While the traditional focus of research to this trend, the selection of the most appropriate source for IT
on the Ir function has been internally focused on the relationship infrastructure requirements is no longer restricted to the internal
between IS and line management (e.g., the centralization- IS department, but has been extended to a diverse range of IT
decentralization issue; see King [1983] for a review), the vendors such as computer manufacturers, s> tems integrators, and
contemporary thrust of this research is beginning to emphasize ·telecommunications service providers. As aptly summed up in
the external dimension of the organization. This is especially a leading trade periodical,
per nent in view of the need for many firms to acquire IT-based
competencies from external sources (Elam et al. 1988). Nothing is sacred about information technology any-
more. Tough times and cutthroat competition are
The significant shift in mode of IT governance was, in fact, causing many companies to examine spending across
proffered in a prognostic article by Dearden (1987), where the the board - including in information systems areas.
IS organization is argued to be "withering away" as end-users [Computerworld, September 9,1991, p. 67]
gain greater control of their computing environments and, more
significantly, as external software specialists take charge of In line with the recent attention on IT outsourcing as a serious
corporate systems development. This radical change in the locus
strategic option for corporations, this paper examines the
determinants of this form of sourcing based on the perceivedofcontrol for Irresponsibilityresults in an eventual obsolescence benefits and risks as well as the performance implications. For
of the corporate IS department. A critical impetus underlying this this purpose, we build a conceptual model of outsourcing that ismovement has been the economic advantage of software tested with primary data obtained from the chief information
specialists in offering systems solutions at lower costs to officers (CIOs) of 159 Fortune 500 corporations. The thrust of
corporate clients. Further, as IT gets increasingly sophisticated, our research model is based on an initial factor analysis of some
corporations need to rely on outside expertise that is more capable variables that generated four orthogonal variables: (1) technical
in keeping up with leading-edge technologies. benefit; (2) business benefit; (3) control risk; and (4) opportunism
277
risk. We regressed these variables with alternative measures of provoking caption: "You don ft own a power plant for your
outsourcing to discern the corresponding relationships. The next electricity....Why own a data center for your information
part of the model examines the relationship between firm systemsT' (Computerworld, June 4,1990, p. 80). In addition, the
performance and outsourcing. Accordingly, we performed a test extensive and often sensational coverage of outsourcing by the
of this relationship with cost structure as a moderator. business and trade presses fueled the exploding interest in this
strategic recourse.
Our paper adds to the emerging literature on IT outsourcing that
focuses on rigorous economic modeling (Richmond, Seidmann, 3. A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR IT
and Whinston 1992; Whang 1992) and insightful case analyses OUTSOURCING
(Huber 1993; Lacity and Hirschheim 1992). More specifically,
this paper extends the existing stream of empirical outsourcing Beyond the extensive anecdotal afrmation on outsourcing, there
studies of Loh and Venkatraman (19924 1992b, 19924. It is a fundamental need within the ]T profession to develop a fuller
develops and tests a conceptual model of outsourcing based on understanding of the phenomenon based on theory-oriented
critical benefit and risk determinants; this pushes beyond their frameworks and empirical tests. While the conventional wisdom
cross-sectional model that considers firm-level factors such as is that outsourcing can be advantageous for the firm, it is
cost structure and performance. Further, through its explicit necessary for researchers to delineate an adequate yet
examination of performance impacts with cost shcture as a parsimonious model of this mode of IT governance and to test it
moderator, it provides a further test of their findings that the stock rigorously with data obtained from firms. In this spirit, we build
marka reacts favorably to the adoption of outsourcing decisions, an outsourcing model that encompasses both a relevant set of
especially under conditions of high business cost structure and determinants and the performance implications. Figure l depicts
low business performance. the model, which is elaborated as follows.
2. OUTSOURCING IN PERSPECTIVE Benefits
Outsourcing IT became increasingly significant as rapid -
l Technical
advanczments in technology renders it exceptionally difficult for
firms to cost-efficiently develop the requisite competencies to  \Ji
t (+) Structure
manage the complex rr function. 'Ihe diversity and fluctuation C Bwiness +412 (+) 
of]Trequirements associated with end-user departments within - #; 1
the firm make it even more difficult for the IS organization to .-.
continually service user needs effectively. Indeed, a radical ( rrQI,=Cing ) • . pafurnlalle
transformation of the IS organization seems to be in place (Elam 1-15 (+)
et al. 1988). 'Ihe monolithic centralized IS department is giving Control Hal,A/
way to a streamlined decentralized corporate entity as IT --/
responsibility is increasingly moved toward external vendors.
The recent rise of IT outsourcing is perhaps boosted by the
Risksadoption of this administrative practice by large firms. Indeed,
the decision madeby a Fortune 18 firm, Eastman Kodak, in July
1989, to hand over its entire data center to IBM, its Figure 1. Our Conceptual Model for IT Outsourcing
microcomputer operations to Businessland, and its
telecommunications and data networks to Digital Equipment 3.1 Technical Benefit
Corp. (DEC) and IBM represents a major point of departure for
the customary in-house mode of rr governance (Applegate and The technical imperative to acquire IT-based competencies is a
Montealegre 1991). Due to the prominence of this case, the widely-cited driver for outsourcing. Traditionally, technology
diffusion of rr outsourcing became more rapid as firms started
to consider fr outsourcing as a viable strategic option (Loh and
refers to "the information, equipment, techniques, and processes
Venkatraman 1992b). required to transform inputs into outputs in the organ
ization"
(Robbins 1987, p. 125). The contemporary view, however, _
Further, outsourcing has been encouraged by the aggressive push highlights a perspective of "technology as knowledge" (Deiaco,
by vendors to win outsourcing contracts. Ihe wide array of Hornell, and Vickery 1990). Accordingly, this considers the
marketing efforts used in this respect has been somewhat intangible assets and capabilities embodied in the firm rs ability
impressive. For instance, Martin Marietta Information Systems to appropriate and benefit from the creation, dissemination, and
Group ran an advertisement with a creative and certainly thought- utilization of know-how (Nelson and Winter 1982).
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Because technology, in particular, IT, is a complex and dynamic Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between IT
knowledge resource, firms are often limited in their abilities to outsourcing and business benefit.
be on the leading edge of the technology frontier (Quinn 1992).
Further, it is usually costly and inefficient for firms that are 3.3 Control Risk
undeveloped in their IT capability to be innovative in their
implementation of the technology. The acquisition of computing Within the business and IT communities, a major inhibitor that
technologies and technical expertise from external sources is a tends to discourage firms from outsourcing rr is the control issue.
means in response to this need for technological knowledge. Firms are, in general, reluctant in shifting the locus of IT
Thus: competencies toward external suppliers as it means that the
decision rights over the assets are vested in vendors that might
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between IT not share the same goals as the client organization. 'Ihe crux of
outsourcing and technical benefit. the problem of control lies in the agency relationship that
develops whenever an outsourcing contract is undertaken between
3.2 Business Benefit two parties. Agency theory has indeed been advanced as an
important conceptual framework to view an economic exchange
While IT has been traditionally positioned as a purely technical (see Eisenhardt [1989] for a review).
domain that provides administrative support for the corporation,
it has recently been established as an integral component of the In the specific context of ]T outsourcing, the client becomes the
business strategy (Ives and I.earmonth 1984). The effective principal while the vendor takes on the role of the agent to whom
governance of the IT function is thus intimately linked to an authorityhas been delegated. As in any principal-agent setting,
overriding business imperative (Henderson and Venkatraman problems arise when the goals of the two contracting parties
1993). In particular, the choice of structural mechanisms to diverge. 'Ihecrux oftherelationship thuslies in theability of the
source IT-based competencies is fundamentally rooted in the view client to monitor the vendor such that tile incidence of goal
incongruence is mitigated. To the extent in which this form of
to enhance business success in the competitive marketplace. control is feasible, there is an inherent risk when rr is being
outsourced. For instance, the loss in control may be manifestedA keybusiness argument to outsource IT draws from the need for in the lack of autonomy in decision-making, resource usage, or
the corporation to focus on core business operations. This relates even security of information assets. Thus:
to core competencies that refer to the collective learning of the
corporation and relates centrally on its capability to coordinate Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between IT
diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of outsourcing and control risk.
technologies (Prahalad and Hamel 1990). IT may be a critical
component in the core competencies of the firm. The 3.4 Opportunism Risk
management of the IT infrastructure in the information era is
indeed a sophisticated activity. Companies are often distracted While control risk considers the inability of the client to enforce
from their fundamental business strategic thrusts in the adequate performance and goal alignment by the vendor, there
marketplace bythe ongoing impediments related to the operation is another form of risk that relates to the possibility of deliberate
of the IT function. opportunistic behavior by vendors. In any business relationship,
there is'no guarantee that a supplier would not indulge in self-
Beside the core competence argument, business drivers to
serving behavior before and after the contract is signed.
outsource IT also include the basic need to reduce cost of Indeed, the potential of nuances in any dyadic is a most powerfuloperadons. Given the ubiquitous nature of IT that pervades the consideration in the formation of any buyer-seller relationship.
entire process of tansforming input into output (Porter and Millar These problems at the interorganizational level constitute the
1985), the costs associated with a particular IT governance thrust of the transaction cost paradigm (Williamson 1975, 1985).
include not only direct technology costs but also indirect costs of Along a broad view, transaction costs refer to the costs connected
supporting the administration ofthe firm Thus, a firm with a low to the exchange of goods or services across the boundary of the
cost efficiency will have to consider the available options to firm. These include the costs of negotiation, monitoring, and
reduce its overaltlevel ofcosts (e.g., materials, labor, marketing, enforcement in the contract .between the participants of the
infrastucture) which constitute the business cost structure. This relationship. Accordingly, the firm exists as a direct consequence
consideration may include reassessing the positioning of its IT of market failure, more specifically, in instances where the
infrastructure within the scope of the firm's hierarchy. Here, cost transaction costs associated with the market alternative are too
savings can take the specific form of reduction of debt expenses high. The transaction constitutes the fundaunental unit of
or the more general form of efficiency of the entire business. organizational analysis and the focus of the transaction cost tenet
is the selection of the most efficient governance mechanism.Hence:
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In the specific setting of IT outsourcing, transaction costs are S trassmann ( 1990) assert that IT is an important business
prevalent when vendors engage in opportunistic behavior. This resource with strong implications for its overall cost structure.
would then be a significant risk for the client before, during, and In other words, the ability to improve performance through IT
after the outsourcing agreement process. The risk of opportunism outsourcing is influenced by the firm's prevailing cost structure.
is especiallypertinent given the extensive and complex range of Firms that have an unfavorable cost structure tend to be able to
details and contingencies for rr-based contracting (see Brandon improve their performance through outsourcing. Thus:
and Halvei 1990). For instance, such behavior may involve a -
biased portrayal of outsourcing advantages (i.e., Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between
misrepresentation), a subsequent over-dependence on specific performance and IT outsourcing, moderated
vendors (i.e., "lock-in'D, or a violation of terms of contract (i.e., by cost structure.
breach). Therefore:
4. METHODS
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between IT
outsourcing and opportunism risk. 4.1 Data
3.5 Performance Implications Our research utilizes primary data derived from a questionnaire
administered to the CIOs of theparticipating corporations as well
Within a traditional notion based on "make-versus-buy," the as secondary data obtained from corporate financial statements.
st>lized view is that a firm evaluates the total costs of maintaining In first phase of our data collection, we wrote to the chief
the ]T in-house (i.e., insourcing) relative to those of moving it out executive officers (CEOs) of the Fortune Industrial and Service
to vendors (i.e., outsourcing). Thus, the firm selects the most 500 corporations with an invitation for them to participate in our
efficient mode ofgovernance to organize its productive activities.
Such a choice involves a minimization of all costs at the levels
study. The CEOs were requested to provide the names of the
of the firm (client) as well as the dyad (client-vendor); this is CIOs (or an equivalent senior manager). To mitigate any
synonymous to the maximization of profits. selection bias fro
m companies that have or have not outsourced
or are considering whether to outsource, our research project was
In the specific context of IT outsourcing, efficiency-based entitled "Study on Information Technology Strategy." The final
reasonings have been a critical basis for the strategic management result was a set of 226 corporations that agreed to participate.
of IT. Tile thrust of our argument is that firms, in general,
consider the set of benefits and risks, as stipulated earlier, in In the second phase, we mailed our instrument directly to the
making sourcing choices. When the benefits for outsourcing CIOs of these corporations. In this correspondence, we
outweigh the accompanying risks, the firm can advantageously emphasized that their corporations had agreed to participate in
seek a vendor to manage its rr. 'Ihus, we maintain that IT our study through the ofice of the CEO. In addition, these CIOs
outsourcing is positively related to performance (see also Loh and were specially nominated by their CEOs as the most
Venkatraman [19920] which demonstrates a favorable stock knowledgeable managers for the study. To further encourage
market reaction to outsourcing). response, we indicated that the participants would be invited for
a special symposium as well as receive an executive report, both
However, a general contention that outsourcing unconditionally of which would be useful for their company in the strategic
results in superior performance is unsound. If that is so, all firms
should outsource their rr. We argue that the performance impact
management of rr. We obtained useable responses from 159
ofoutsourcing is moderated bythe cost suucture of the firm. Our
CIOs, representing a return rate of 70.4%.
basic argument follows Loh and Venkatraman (19924 19920),
which establishes a positive relationship between cost structure 4.2
Key Informant Considerations
and IT outsourcing. Accordingly, the business cost structure is
a fundamental component within the competitive strategy of a In most primary data collection processes, the use of key
firm. In the setting of a competitive marketplace, the relative informants is a cnicial component of the research design (Phillips
costs of producing and selling the goods critically affect a finn fs and Bagozzi 1986). Here, the respondents of the survey are
asked
business success. to provide information pertaining to the unit of analysis; in other
words, they are required to furnish details of organizational
When the cost structure is unfavorable, the firm faces the need characteristics that may involve aggregation and interpretation.
to restructure its business so as to maintain or regain its Traditionally, researchers have ascribed three source
s of validity
fundamental sources ofcompetitive advantage. This may involve threats in the use of key informants, namely: (1) motivational
a reconfiguration of its organizational infrastructure, including barrier; (2) perceptual and cognitive limitations; (3) lack of
themodeof governing the rr activities. Further, Keen (1991) and
information (Huber and Power 1985).
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We mitigated these threats as follows: First, our study reduced The outsourcing variable was operationalized in three ways. One,
motivational barrier by indicating to the respondents that they had the CIOs were requested to rate the overall degree of outsourcing
been specially chosen by the CEO. We also provided an for three important IT domains - application development, data
assurance ofconfidentiality. As mentioned before, we encouraged center management, and telecommunications/network
participation by stating that all respondents would be invited for management - with reference to their counterparts in the same
an rr stategy syInposium and would receive a managerial report. industry. Our measure was constructed as the average of the
Second, we minimized perceptual and cognitive limitations degree of outsourcing in the three domains. Two, the CIOs were
through detailed pretesting prior to the survey. 1he pretest helped asked to rate the change in the degree of outsourcing for the three
in thedevelopment of the specific questions in the survey in terms domains over the last three years. Again, we developed a
ofboth content and format. It involved twelve practitioners from measure based on the average of the domains. Bree, we formed
various user, vendor, and consulting corporations who were a ratio of outsourcing expenditures with the total IT expenditures
potential respondents or are familiar with our research topic as using the figures provided by the CIOs.
well as ten academicians who were experts in survey methodology
or rr strategy. Third, the lack of information was circumvented As for performance, we used objective data obtained kim
by the use of the most knowledgeable senior managers as Standard and Poorts Compustat. This mitigates the disadvantage
identified by the CEO. The typical respondent for the study is the ofperceptual evaluation that might be potentially supplied by the
CIO of the corporation; in cases where there is no CIO, the key informants. We employed two measures of performance.
respondent is typically the vice-president for information systems First, we applied a hybrid market-based measure of performance
or the most senior IT director. through the ratio of the average market value with the book value
for the fiscal *ar ending after the survey was administered. This
4.3 Analysis .approach is consistent with Loh and Venkatraman (1992c), which
considers the impact of outsourcing on market value of firms.
l'he test of our conceptual model involved two sets of multiple Second, we utilized a pure accounting-based measure of
regression. I[he first phase considered the effects of the performance, namely, return on equity. I[his is the ratio of net
determinants - benefits and risks - on IT outsourcing. We had income with shareholder equity and is in line with previous
a total of twelve indicators for the benefits and risks. To mitigate studies that examine the relationship between performance and
the potential problems of multicollinearity, we obtained outsourcing (Loh and Venkatraman 19928).
orthogonal determinants through a factor analysis of these
indicators. In this respect, we used the scores derived from a In examining the effects of outsourcing on performance, we have
factor rotation for the regression with three alternative measures postulated a moderating influence from the firm fs cost structure.
of outsourcing. The second phase examined the performance Following Loh and Venkatraman (1992a), this cost structure is
implications of outsourcing. Our analysis here involved a operationalized as the sum of the cost of goods sold and the
moderator, cost structure, that forms a multiplicative term with selling, general, and administrative expenses normalized by firm
outsourcing. This interactive variable was then used for the size. Further, interactive variables are constructed to account for
regression with two measures of performance. the moderating effects of cost stnicture. As in standard regression
anal>Xs involving interaction, such variables are formed by the
4.4 Operationalization multiplication of the appropriate outsourcing variable with the
cost structure variable.
The detailed operationalization of the determinants - technical
benefit, business benefit, control risk, and opportunism risk - 5. RESULTS
is shown in tile appendix; this takes into consideration tile results
of our factor analysis. Essentially, the respondents were asked The results pertaining to the factor analysis of the determinants
to rate the relevance of a set of benefits and risks in the context and risks are shown in Table 1. This analysis is based on a
of their firm. For technical benefit, the key impetuses to principal coinponent method and a val·iinax factor rotation. Four
outsourcing Inay entail access to critical technologies, expertise, factors were extracted and these corresponded to the benefit and
or technological innovations. For business benefit, these may risk determinants developed in our conceptual model. These are
include the need to focus on core businesses as well as cost (1) technical benefit (eigenvalue = 3.31); (2) control risk
savings in operations and financing. For control risk, the major (eigenvalue = 2.39); (3) opportunism risk (eigenvalue = 1.32);
inhibitors of outsourcing may encompass the loss of control in and (4) business risk (eigenvalue = 1.12). We used the factor
decision-making, in use of resources, or in security of information scores derived from this analysis as determinants for the multiple
assets. For opportunism risk, these may involve vendor-based regressions with outsourcing.
nuances such as biased representation of deliverable advantages,
breach of contract, and excessive dependence of specific IT Table 2 suinmarizes the descriptive statistics - mean, standard
suppliers. deviations, and correlations. Interestingly, we observe that the
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Table 1. Factor Analysis Results
' Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Technical Benefit Control Risk Opportunism Risk Business Risk
Eigenvalue 3.313 2.386 1.319 1.116
Cum. Prop. Of Var.
Explained 0.276 0.475 0.585 0.678
Indicators Rotated Factor Pattern
Benefit#1 0.8479 0.0089 -0.0789 0.1155
Benefit #2 0.8918 0.0338 -0.0696 0.0301
Benefit #3 0.8179 -0.0982 -0.0510 0.1512
Benefit #4 0.4711 -0.3001 0.1051 0.5632
Benefit #5 -0.0379 0.1827 -0.1748 0.8361
Benefit#6 0.2802 -0.2171 0.1309 0.7480
Risk #1 -0.0828 0.8326 0.2778 0.0462
Risk #2 -0.0317 0.8726 0.0738 -0.1164
Risk #3 0.0193 0.6475 0.3109 -0.0424
Risk #4 -0.0102 0.2800 0.7303 0.1076
Risk #5 -0.1189 0.2064 0.6046 0.0155
Risk #6 -0.0242 0.0625 0.7988 -0.1191
Note: See the appendix for the full definition of the indicators for benefits and risks.
average degree of outsourcing is below 4 on a Likert seven-point Whinston build an incomplete contracting model for IS
scalebut the average change in outsourcing in the last three years development outsourcing that is based on corporate decision
is greater than 4. This is an indication that IT outsourcing is makers adopting rational investment choices. Whang uses a
expected to increase with respect to time. From the correlation game-theoretic model to show that outsourcing can be an optimal
matrix, we can see that the directionalities of the correlations all outcome aligning incentives of the contracung parties under
conform to our expectations; these correlations are also generally asymmetric information.
significant Interestingly, the correlation of the two performance
mezsures-market value-book value and return on equity - is On the empirical side, outsourcing research takes on two
not strong; this may reflect the very different nature and thrust of directions. First, it adopts an interpreuve approach in examining
the indicators. the qualitative aspects of the phenomenon. In this respect, Lacity
In Table 3, we depict the results pertaining to the three sets Of
and Hirschheim employ a multiple case study methodology to
multiple regressions for alternative measures of outsourcing as disp
el several conventional myths associated with outsourcing.
dependent variables. We can see that Hypotheses 1 to 4 are
Huber illustrates the decision-making process of outsourcing for
supported and the results are robust across different regressions. a major bank. Second, the research utilizes a positivist approach
Table 4 (a, b, c) presents the regression results for discerning the in understanding the phenomenon based on a statistical analysis
performance implications of outsourcing. All six regression of large samples. For instance, the stream of research by Loh and
coefficients are significant in the expected direction. Based on Venkatraman (1992a, 1992b, 1992c) applies secondary data to
these coefficients, support for Hypothesis 5 is suggested. investigate (1) the determinants of outsourcing using a cross-
section of firms, (2) tile diffusion of outsourcing using a
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION longitudinal examination of adoption influences, and (3) the
impact of outsourcing decisions on the market value of firms.
Scholarlyworks in IT outsourcing are in the formative stage. On
the theoretical side, the research has been rooted in the economic This paper is in line with the positivist thrust of empirical






Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2(a)
Correlations
Ave. Degree of Ave. Change in Ratio of
Mean Std. Dev. Outsourcing Outsourcing Outsourcing
Ave. Degree of Outsourcing 3.3753 1.2910 1.0000
Ave. Change in Outsourcing 4.3517 0.8507 0.3574*** 1.0000
Ratio of Outsourcing 0.0962 0.1604 0.4297*** 0.3243*** 1.0000
Technical Benefit -0.0239 0.9850 0.1905* 0.3024*** 0.1605*
Business Benefit -0.0037 1.0244 0.3262*** 0.0328 0.3001***
Control Risk -0.0717 0.9966 -0.1864* -0.1869* -0.2129**
Opportunism Risk 0.0677 0.9683 -0.1184+ -0.1369+ -0.2713***
Table 2(b)
Correlations
Market Value- Return on
Mean Std.·Dev Book Value Equity
Market Value-Book Value 0.6444 0.7866 1.0000
Return on Equity 0.0522 0.3267 0.1067 1.0000
Outsourcing Degree * Cost Structure 2.7144 2.8479 0.2015* 0.1347+
Outsourcing Change * Cost Structure 3.4532 3.0535 0.2554** 0.1501+
Outsourcing Ratio * Cost Structure 0.0612 0.1174 0.1281+ 0.2644**
Note: +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Table 3. Benefit and Risk Determinants of Outsourcing
Average Degree of Average Change in Ratio of Outsourcing
Outsourcing Outsourcing Expenditures
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
Technical Benefit 0.2538** 0.1072 0.2662** 0.0722 0.0268* 0.0130
Business Benefit 0.3947*** 0.1032 0.0144 0.0695 0.0441** 0.0125
Control Risk -0.2271* 0.1061 -0.1650* 0.0714 -0.0322** 0.0129
Opportunism Risk -0.1424+ 0.1091 -0.1146+ 0.0734 -0.0431** 0.0132









Table 4. Performance lImplications of Outsourcing
Table 4(a)
Market Value-Book Value Return on Equity
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
Outsourcing Degree * Cost Structure 0.0557* 0.0256 0.0154+ 0.0107





Market Value-Book Value Return on Equity
- Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
Outsourcing Degree * Cost Structure 0.0658** 0.0235 0.0161+ 0.0100
Constant 04173*** 0.1083 -0.0032 0.0460
0.0652 0.0225
F - 7.812** 2.580
N 114 114
Table 4(c)
Market Value-Book Value Return on Equity
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
Outsourcing Degree * Cost Structure 0.8586+ 0.6278 0.7358** 0.2536




Note: +p< 0.1; *p< 0.05;**p< 0.01;***p< 0.001
by getting access to primary data generated through a outsourcing. Ihis indicates that outsourcing can be discouraged
quesdonnaire survey. Thus, being a first study in this respect, it whenever firms cannot effectively maintain control of the
adds significantly to the outsourcing literature. In fact, the results relationships or are subject to vendor-based nuances. Ill addition,
obtained pertaining to our conceptual model have been very our results lend credence to those of Loh and Venkatraman
encouraging, judging from the strong support for the five (1992c) since we have found that outsourcing is associated with
hypotheses. favorable firm-level performance, moderated by cost structure.
Specifically, we have demonstrated that both technical and The overall thrust of our results suggests that outsourcing has
business benefits are significant motivators of outsourcing. This been effectivelyexploited, at least in the descriptive sense. Firms
implies that firms adopt outsourcing whenever they can do consider the relevance ofparticular benefits in making choices
maximally leverage from this mode of IT governance in terms of in the level of outsourcing; at the same time, they are also aware
technical and business benefits. We have also shown that both of the risks that accompany this mode of IT sourcing.
control and opportunism risks are significant inhibitors of Considering that our study indicates the importance of out-
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sourcing as a serious mode of IT governance, there might be "clearing house" where relationships are continuously formed and
broader implications for the future shape of the IT organization shaped. The management of the IS organization in the next
century would then demand a totally new skill set. Beyond the
First, while vendors have traditionally been considered as "armfs technical knowledge of today, the lS professional of tomorrow
length" suppliers of IT products and services, the performance needs to be well-grained in the management of relationships.
improvetlient potential of outsourcing tends to point to the need Above all, thejob would entail the "soft skills" in human relations
to coopt external partners in delivering the required IT more than the "hard skills" of technological operations.
competences. Most of the existing agreements have, however,
been predicated on the underlying logic of a dichotomous choice 7. REFERENCES
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Benefits #1 to #3:
Outsourcing has been said to be beneficial for firms. However, not all benefits may be applicable to every firm. How
relevant (or irrelevant) are the following be,i€/Its of outsourcing for your firtn?
Irrelevant Relevant
Access to critical computer technologies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Access to technical expertise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Promoting innovation in IT usage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Business Benefit
Benefits #4 to #6:
Outsourcing has been said to be beneficial for firms. However, not all benefits may be applicable to every firm. How
relevant (or irrelevant) are the following ben€/its of outsourcing for your firm?
Irrelevant Relevant
Focus on core business operations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Reduction ofdeb financing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Savings in operating the entire business 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Control Risk
Risks #1 to #3:
'Ihe risks of outsourcing affect firms in different degree. How significant (or insignificant) would the following be considered
as potential risks in IT outsourcing for your firm?
Insignificant Significant
Risk Neutral Risk
Loss of autonomy in decision making 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Loss of control over resources 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Loss of security over computer assets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Opportunism Risk
Risks #4 to #6:
'Ihe risks of outsourcing affect firms in different degree. How significant (or insignificant) would the following be considered
as potential risks in IT oursourcing for your firm?
Insigtiificant Significant
Risk Neutral Risk
Breach of contract by vendors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dependence on specific vendors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7




How do you rate the overalt degree of outsourcing for the following specific rr areas in your firm?
Low relative to other High relative to other
firms in our industry Same firms in our industry
Loss of autonomy in decision making 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Loss ofcontrol over resources 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Loss of security over computer assets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(This measure is computed as the average of the 3 scores).
Outsourcing ¢2:
How has the outsourcing of IT requirements changed for the following specific IT areas in your firm?
Decreased over Increased over
last 3 years Same last 3 years
Application developmp.nt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Data center management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Telecoms/network management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(This measure is computed as the average of the 3 scores)
Outsourcing #3:
Please provide the following information on your firm:
(a) annual total it expenditures
(b) annual outsourcing expenditures
(This measure is computed as the ratio of the 2 expenditure levels.)
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